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MODELS OF REBELLION: AN ESSAY IN
CIVILIZATION ANALYSIS
Vytautas Kavolis

I

I need to begin by defining several key terms." By a
symbolic design I refer to an arrangement of meanings,
perceptions, and emotional nuances objectified in a
cultural document, such as a myth, a work of art, or a
philosophical system. 3 4 By the symbolic designs of a
civilization I refer to those arrangements of meanings,
perceptions, and emotional nuances which can be regarded as statements about the long-enduring "inner
qualities" of a civilization—the latter being defined as
the largest distinguishable system of sociocultural organization of human behavior at each level of societal
evolution.
What has been conceived of as civilizational analysis
centers on the comparative study of the symbolic designs characteristic of and enduring for a considerable
historical period in particular civilizations. 35, 36 Civilization analysis differs from intellectual or art history in
that the former is concerned with symbolic configurations only to the extent that they express, and give rise
to, the distinctiveness of particular civilizations—sociocultural uniqueness on the largest empirically demonstrable scale. Civilization analysis may be conducted either in the "humanistic" or in the "sociological" manner. When conducted sociologically, it must
meet the further requirement that possible linkages
between symbolic designs and modes of social organization be investigated. The sociological version of civilization analysis also implies that the specific distinctiveness of each civilization at a point in time is seen as
the result of a particular conjunction (or disjunction) of
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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basic sociocultural mechanisms, each of which with an
empirically demonstrable degree of "general validity"—that is, operating to a highly similar effect wherever it occurs in its pure, or "ideal-typical," form.
In my view, it is at least as advantageous, in the
comparative study of the symbolic designs of civilizations, to begin with the significant detail as to attempt
to comprehend the total structure within which this
detail is located. As one proceeds in analyzing the "significant detail," one's analytical framework necessarily
expands into the aspects of the "total structure" relevant to it. But focusing on the significant details permits
us to be more sensitive to changes over time in the
symbolic designs and the underlying structures of consciousness and modes of sensibility—a topic which civilizationists, in contrast to the intellectual historians,
have tended rather to neglect (unless their own background has been in
Geistesgeschichte).a
In this essay, the "significant detail" will be a thematic component dealt with in a mythological system or
its equivalents and embodied in an anthropomorphic or
animate figure. Anthropomorphic constructs embodying a thematic component frequently (especially in the
Near East and in Greece) provide the bonus of a sociopsychological theory suggesting how the behavior expressive of the thematic component is perceived to
have been motivated and how this kind of motivation is
thought to have developed in the life history of an
a n t h r o p o m o r p h i c figure. The sociopsychological
theory may unfold through the history of the various
interpretations of the myth, all of which need to be
taken into account in an effort to reconstitute it.
Ideally, an anthropomorphic mythological construct
provides: (1) a universal "model of consciousness" for
comprehending a particular type of human behavior, (2)
a psychological theory revealing how, and of what materials, a particular civilization constructs psychological theories, and (3) a suggestion of the sociological
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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setting within which either (a) the particular type of
behavior tends to arise or (b) the particular psychological theory is generated.
II
These general considerations may be fleshed out a bit
by comparing the myths of Prometheus and of Satan,
both of which treat the general theme of rebellion by an
individual against the supreme authority in the established order and against the rules by which this order
operates. 44, 47, 2 4 , 3 3 But Prometheus rebels, in stealing
fire against the prohibition of Zeus, motivated by sympathy for the sufferings of those unlike himself—people
deprived of fire, and he gives them practical assistance
without imposing on them either his own values or his
leadership. He permits them to incorporate his technical gifts into the structure of their own life, as they
themselves see fit.
Surely what might be called the "humane attachment-practical assistance mechanism" is a universal
possibility, experienced and observed by people in all
civilizations. But what is remarkable is that the
Greeks—or some significant Greeks—have associated
the humane attachment-practical assistance mechanism with what they themselves thought of as the crime
of rebellion against established authority or, more precisely, against a concrete inequity in the normative
order sanctioned by it. Rebellion is therefore a "noble
crime"; and in the life history of the rebel (or in the
historical development of his image) the substantive
personal virtue of the individual overcomes the formal
criminality of his act.
This is one model for conceptualizing the behavior of
the rebel. The other is the Satanic model. As described
in Medieval Christian writings, Satan rebels out of resentment. The causes of his resentment are variously
interpreted by the theologians: he is the first of the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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angels who thinks he has been replaced in God's affection by a "younger sibling"—man or Christ; he objects
to having been created by someone else and wants to be
the sole maker of his own identity. But he rebels not out
of sympathy for others, but from resentment of what he
perceives as loss or lack of recognition of his own
excellence—"pride, born of e n v y " and " a sense of his
own greatness." 2 6 And, while he employs wealth and
power as a means for attaining control over those he
seeks to corrupt, he is wholly unconcerned with meeting the practical (food, warmth or health) needs of anyone.
Indeed, both as the servant of God, in the story of
Job, and as the evil one, Satan appears to find the
peaceful enjoyment of material comfort intolerable.
The simple felicities of ordinary life offend against Satan's single-minded pursuit of absolute " v i r t u e " or, in
his transformed state, "anti-virtue." The final goal of
the resentful idealist is to create a total alternative to the
divine order, an "adversary culture" and, within it, to
assume God's place. But the results of his activities are
wholly destructive. While Prometheus, a materialistrationalist "partial rebel" who sought only to provide a
useful service, winds up evoking a new conception of
justice which even Zeus, in the lost parts of the Aeschylean trilogy, apparently comes to accept—Satan
proves unable to create any value and can only mock
the old by inverting them. The would be total innovator
is enchained to the inverse of all of the old.
Satanic behavior can be conceptualized psychologically as governed by the resentment-destruction mechanism. Surely this mechanism, too, is a universal possibility, experienced and observed by people in all civilizations. But note that in the Judeo-Christian, and
particularly the medieval Christian, tradition it is the
resentment-destruction mechanism that is firmly attached to the theme of rebellion against the legitimately
established power holders and the normative order rephttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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resented by them. Within this tradition, there is no
nobility in the crime of rebellion against the existing
normative order. Rebellion is in itself evil even when its
occurrence is "objectively necessary" for the completion of the larger design of God and contributes to the
comprehension, by men, of this design. What is
"spontaneous" in Satan is evil even though this spontaneity has been "provided f o r " and kept "under control" by the irreplaceable occupant of the commanding
heights of " p o w e r " and "goodness."
The connection between rebellion and the resentment-destruction mechanism is much more central to
the Christian tradition than the linkage between rebellion and the sympathy-assistance mechanism in the
Greek civilization. Prometheus was far less important
in Greek mythology than Satan in the medieval Christian. But, centrality aside, the linkage of the cultural
theme of rebellion with the psychological mechanism of
humane attachment resulting in practical assistance to
others is, among the historic civilizations, a distinctively Greek theme. The older Plato would not have
appreciated it, but in no other pre-modern civilization
has this particular linkage of themes been given a
mythological elaboration anywhere approaching that
given to it by Hesiod and Aeschylus." And we are
concerned not only with what is central to a civilization,
but also with what is unique in it.
We have, so far, two interpretative models of rebellion, both potentially applicable to the behavior of actual rebels in any civilization. The first model suggests
that rebellion, motivated by humane sympathy for the
sufferings of others and expressed through particular
acts of practical assistance, results in an enduringly
valuable change in the structure of the moral universe.
The other model contends that rebellion motivated by
personal resentment, and expressed in global attempts
to create an alternative style of life and impose it on
others, is destructive in its consequences. We also have
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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the historical fact that one of these potentially universal
theories of rebellion has been created by important
representatives of the Greek civilization, and the other
has possessed immense influence in the medieval
Christian civilization (and in some of its secular derivatives). Is the selection of the theoretical model by which
to interpret rebellion a consequence of the different
behavior of key rebels in the two civilizations, or is it an
expression of differences in the cognitive structure of
the two civilizations at the time when these models
acquired their hold over the imagination?
Before addressing myself to this question, however, I
wish to compare the psychogenetic theories contained,
or implied, in the Promethean and the Satanic legends
to account for the origins of the rebel. What is most
distinctive of Satan at his earliest appearance in the Old
Testament is that he is a function of God specializing in
ferreting out potential transgressors and bringing them
to God's attention to be punished. He is, on the one
hand, an absolute servant, created by his master, who
has no existence of his own, no civil rights, and no
social ties except the bond of obedience against which
he eventually rebels; and, on the other hand, he is the
enforcer of morality, the chairman of the Heavenly
Un-Godly Activities Committee. When the absolute
servant rebels, he can only imagine himself replacing
the despot at the peak of the power structure, without
disturbing the structure itself; and he will be more merciless than his former master. He who begins as the
enforcer of morality, ends as the great corrupter.
Prometheus, on the other hand, is an independent
from the very beginning of his conscious existence. He
has his own independent position, not delegated to him
by a higher authority; he has his own relatives, wife,
and children; and, above all, he has his own knowledge—the ability to predict the future—which is in
fact superior to the knowledge possessed by the ruler
of the gods. c It would have been inconceivable for Satan
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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to have known more than God does. That is, the Satanic
rebel acts out of ignorance, on the basis of an inferior,
self-deceptive theory. Or so the Judeo-Christian tradition, in which, at the peak of the hierarchies of knowledge and power, knowledge tends to be identified with
power, interprets the intellectual condition of the rebel.
In Greece, it was possible for highest power to be perceived as deficient in knowledge (as well as in virtue).
Prometheus, then, begins as the equivalent of a
knowledgeable, high-status adolescent used to making
his own decisions. The first significant decision he
makes is in fact one to support Zeus in his battle against
the Titans, who are members of Prometheus' own family. This decision—in some ways the equivalent of
Crane Brinton's "desertion of the intellectuals" in the
revolutionary process 4 —proves to be a mistake, since
Zeus, in power, becomes a ruthless tyrant. Rebellion,
for Prometheus—if not necessarily in conscious intention, then in its objective effects—functions as an expiation for the unintended wrongs he had earlier helped to
create by having aligned himself with an emergent tyranny. While the expiation motive is not specifically
mentioned in the Greek texts, the logic of Promethean
behavior permits this interpretation, as Satanic behavior does not. Satan could feel no guilt for what he had
done in serving his master (in bringing down, for example, the undeserved misfortunes of Job), since, having
been created entirely as a tool of that master, he did not
develop the habit of considering himself responsible for
his own actions. It is he who perceives himself as the
blameless agent of a greater power—or as the necessary
evil—rather than he who has reason to know he has
been a fool in his own judgments, who develops into the
resentful destroyer. d
One f u r t h e r element in the background of Prometheus is his part as a trickster who delights in substituting bones and fat for meat in a sacrifice to Zeus,
thus deceiving the supreme authority without any moPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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tive apparent in this action other than the pure fun of
it. 23 Satan, on the other hand, does not appear capable
of pure fun, unrelated to the single-mindedness of his
service to God (in his earlier career) or to that of his
rebellion against God (in his later identity). Thus the
final psychogenetic summary of the evolution of
Satanic and Prometheus types of rebellion: abstract
justice, combined with resentment, corrupts the absolute servant; playful trickery, to which
sympathetic
kindness is added, permits a moral evolution in an
independent
mind.
We now have not only two models of rebellious behavior, but also two psychological theories of how
these respective types of behavior have come about.
And the civilization-comparative question may be repeated on another level: Why did the Greek and the
Judeo-Christian civilizations develop different "psychological" theories of the origin of rebellion against
authority?
Two possible approaches to this question may be
suggested. The first focuses on differences in the depth
structure of moral thinking of the two civilizations. The
dominant Judeo-Christian tendency, shaped or reinforced by Iranian influences, and surviving in a variety
of secular ideologies of Western-European derivation,
has been to adopt a "mobilizing," or "reifying," attitude toward moral issues. The goal implicit in this
attitude is to enhance the " g o o d " and to exorcise the
" e v i l " in history and personality by rigidly separating
them, as objects of total worship and absolute condemnation, in the mythological constructs used to comprehend historical experiences and subjective states of
the personality. This attitude has also been strong in the
North African and Near Eastern Islamic traditions, and
has recently revived there.
The Greeks, in contrast, have sometimes been able to
adopt a "developmental," or "dialectical," attitude
toward moral issues, with the implicit goal of integrathttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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ing a recognized " e v i l " (e.g., the crime of rebellion)
with the presumed " g o o d " (e.g., the authority of the
legal order) in such a way that the "evil" is gradually
transformed into the " g o o d , " or functions as an indispensable challenge to it, while the " g o o d " must be
exposed to a searching criticism of its claims, in the
absence of which it stands in danger of revealing itself
as (or degenerating into) another form of "evil." 0 This
attitude is evident not only in the Promethean myth, and
in the conception of Zeus, in whom, as Paul Ricoeur
puts it, "the problematics of the 'wicked g o d / the undivided unity of the divine and the satanic reaches its
highest pitch," 4 2 but also in the treatment of Dionysus,
in whom Christ-like and Satan-like elements are intertwined. 21 39-43 A similar attitude has been evolved
by Freud, and it is not accidental that he gave such
central importance, in his theory, to a Greek myth
(though in his therapeutic practice he was more inclined
to accept the role of the Hebraic God). A somewhat
comparable mode of integrating the "evil" into the
" g o o d " has been evolved in Hasidism (e.g., " U s e evil
to do good").
Within the relatively enduring Indian and Chinese
structures of moral thinking, the primary categories to
which substance is attributed are not " g o o d " and
" e v i l , " and the relationships between the fundamental
opposites take the form neither of " b a t t l e " nor of
"dialectical transformation." In Hinduism, dualistic
categories both stand in a relationship of mutual recognition of each other (being in the world and world renunciation) and (as in the purity-pollution distinction)
are used to separate hierarchically arranged entities
representing phases of an interminably cyclical proce s s . 9 3 7 While the categories themselves constitute a
permanent structure, the particular contents of Indian
categories are comparatively fluid: the ascetic becomes
an erotic profligate and bounces back again; an individual moves from being in the world to world renunciaPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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tion; what is "polluting'' overflows and infects the
" p u r e " (but never the opposite, thus suggesting the
strength of "pollution" and the weakness of " p u r i t y , "
in some contrast to the powerful Chinese belief that
good examples normally attract others to emulate
them).
In Confucian China, polarities equal in value but
unequal in power (as in the Yin-Yang paradigm) cooperate, in a rigorously defined but contextually variable
manner, to sustain and develop a harmonious cosmic
hierarchy. 3 - 15 There is less fluidity of the contents of the
categories and more of a "practical" cooperation between the opposites than in the Indian structure of
moral thinking.
In the medieval and early modern European tradition, polar opposites either battle energetically until the
final solution, the outcome of which is predetermined
(the God-Satan model), or are mutually interdependent
in a static hierarchical relationship, which it is impermissible to challenge (as in the notion of the "marriage"
of the soul with the body, in which the "masculine"
soul is entitled to the obedience of the "feminine"
body). 3 8 The result of the concurrent presence of both
of these models in the Western tradition is a constant
tension between "hierarchy" and "dualism": hierarchies are always potentially threatened by a dualistic
militance subversive of them, as they are not in either
India or China.
In contrast to all of these conceptions of the proper
relationship between polar opposites, Greek dramatists
have conceived of a dialectic in which the opposites
evolve, changing their own character and the structure
of their setting, in the course of a battle in which the
cards are not stacked in advance in favor of one participant, as they are in the God-Satan paradigm. While
the image of Prometheus has appealed at various times
and in various ways to European traditions of experie n c e / the Promethean dialectic has re-emerged most
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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prominently in the Romantic imagination. 1 But the
Romantics had a tendency to collapse Satan and Prometheus into one (or rather to impart the psychological
qualities of the former to the imagery of the latter). 13 - 1?s
Marx resonated to this ambience; Stalin remained a
medieval Christian dominant with a factory for the
transformation of humanity in his hands.
The second approach to explaining the differences
between the Greek and the Judeo-Christian models of
rebellious behavior, and between their theories of the
origin of such behavior, can be made on the socialstructural level. The construction of Satan has started
within the general ambience of a militaristic, Persian
" o r i e n t a l d e s p o t i s m , " w h e r e the obligation of
everyone, including the highest officials, has been to
serve the ruler in the manner of disciplined soldiers, and
in which, since the judgment of the supreme power
holder could not legitimately be questioned, failure to
submit to him had to appear as the upheaval of primeval
chaos against the righteousness of civilization. The Persian type of oriental despotism may be contrasted to the
bureaucratic empire of historic China, where officials,
insofar as they were " t r u e gentlemen" (chiin-tzu),
adhered to generalized moral standards of their estate,
by which they could define their own dignity and even
judge their supreme authority, the emperor—thus retaining a certain margin of dignified moral independence relative to him. h
In the Chinese framework, in which supreme worldly
power could legitimately be perceived as deficient in
knowledge and in virtue, rebellion could not automatically be judged as arising outside of the normative order
and as constituting a threat not only to the current
political manifestation of that order, but to the principle
of order itself. Rebellion could therefore not easily be
interpreted within an imagery of the Satanic type. The
most popular image of the rebel in traditional Chinese
fiction is that of a trickster-monkey who, after having
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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fought successfully against all sorts of heavenly powers
and secular sages, ends up as the defender of a Buddhist
pilgrim. 52 53 Rebelliousness, in this case, appears not as
a serious human, angelic or titanic quality, but as a
playful expression of primordial nature, capable, in the
very course of its rebellion, of rising to the level of
moral responsibility. There is a bit of Prometheus in the
monkey, but nothing whatsoever of Satan. Actual rebellions tended in China to be rationalized by the
theorists as expressions of the loss of " t h e mandate of
heaven" and legitimated by the rebels themselves, until
the nineteenth century, in the imagery of the nature
mysticism of popular Taoism and the reassertion of
traditional peasant values.
The myth of Prometheus has been put together in a
society which cultivated "individualistic heroism" in
social action and in fact provided opportunities, for a
privileged elite, to seek this goal. When Prometheus
first appears, in Hesiod, the breaking down of clan
controls was taking place in the absence of both a dominant state organization and a rigorously dualistic intellectual culture. In this setting, a mere semigod senses
the "prerogative of the privileged"—the obligation to
come to the aid of others in his own way, without
waiting for legitimation by any traditional standard or a
newly formulated explicit ideology. A society which
permits individualistic practical (not merely symbolic)
action for at least some of its members is probably
necessary for such trust in one's own private moral
sensitivities, not sanctioned by any imaginable agency
or tradition external to the individual. In a stable peasant society, or within a bureaucracy, such an attitude
would not be credible enough to sustain a great myth.
Yet Prometheus is not a feudal lord, or a Hegelian
"honest soul," acting with the archaic directness of
" h o n o r . " He is a "subtle-spirit" (Aeschylus), a user of
his mind, who has clearly seen oppression and its limits,
and it has become his nature to "think deviously"
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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(Hesiod): it is apparently Prometheus who has invented
the deceptive sacrifice to the powerful. 2 2 But to invent
it, with full conviction in the propriety of his act, he has
not to need it for himself. He is willing to sin, but only
for the concrete benefit of others. In the tradition in
which he originates, this commitment is associated with
supreme intelligence.
Another structural characteristic of the Greek society relevant to the Promethean theme is the presence of
a body of intellectuals, principally the dramatic poets,
who were deeply concerned with interpreting moral
issues, but were not functionaries within, or tightly
controlled by, a religious or political organization, In
the ancient Near East, where moral poetry was, by and
large, in the hands of organized religious bodies, the
priesthoods were organized, like the state, along the
lines of a militaristic "oriental despotism." In the Israelite tradition, where they were not—and where the
institution of prophecy permitted "rebelliousness"
against the established social order in the name of a
higher obedience, Satan originally did not have the
character of a rebel, let alone a nihilistic rebel.
The sense of the virulence of Satan has been taking
shape under the Seleucid conquerors of Palestine, when
a strong movement toward Hellenization in the Jewish
aristocracy, ambitious to increase the scope of its
power, began seriously to threaten the cultural identity
of the Jewish community . 45 The vivid experience of this
threat to national and religious identity must have lent
emotional vitality to the elaboration of the Satanic myth
from its already existing elements into a full-fledged
dramatic explanation of the meaning of the experience
(e.g., in the "temptations" of Christ). Satan emerged
as a religious interpretation of the perceived
readiness
of members of a community, in which high value had
been traditionally placed on group solidarity, to abandon the moral ties of mutual obligation in search of the
recognition of unique personal excellence. The upPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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risings of the period, which reasserted collective identities and the ties of mutual obligation, and the growth of
the Satanic mythology are products of the same historical situation. And a similar situation developed in
Christian Europe at the peak of the power of the devil
and fear of witchcraft toward the end of the Middle
Ages.
Ill
While Prometheus has, since the nineteenth century,
been frequently assimilated to Satan, it is Dionysus—an
avenger of offenses suffered by himself, and a purely
expressive actor totally unconcerned with the practical
needs of others—who is morphologically closer to
Satan. But Dionysus appears to have been raised by
emotionally deprived women in a male-dominated society. In contrast, only the authoritarian Old Testament
patriarch and his servants are mentioned in the domestic environment in which Satan spent the early years of
his career. The "childhood environment" may help
explain why Dionysus, violent as he is, seeks temporary ecstasy rather than permanent power, and being
sacrificed or provoking cannibalism in others are
equally ecstatic fulfillments for him. 3 9 4 3 50
Dionysus creates resources of intense emotionality
where they are, in his absence, lacking. He does not,
however, integrate these resources with the rest of
human existence. Left in his hands, they therefore become destructive forces. In this respect, he is like
Satan: resources that might feed life become agencies of
destruction in the hands of both. And it is in this respect
that Dionysus is unlike Prometheus, who integrates the
resources he has not created—as well as the skills he
has—into the life of other people without doing injury to
the structure of existence of the recipients of his gifts.
Prometheus is a skilled inventor of useful objects and
activities. He also has the gift of prophecy—that is, a
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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valid theory of the future. His ultimate genius, however, does not lie in the generation of light, but in the
precise recognition of brilliance where it exists (=fire,
the source of light and warmth) and its incorporation
into the everyday life of mankind.
In contrast to both Satan and Prometheus, Dionysus
is not himself explicitly a rebel. He is rather an avenger
and a revealer of the barbaric depths suppressed by
civilization. But his actions provide stages for the unacknowledged rebellions of others—those who are
subjected to suffering from the existing structure of
civilization. And it is only the others who suffer the
exhaustion and emptiness which follows, at least in
Euripides, the orgy of mad destructiveness inspired by
Dionysus; their mover, "wearing a mask with a fixed
smile," merely goes away for another travelling exhibition of his sinister powers. 2 5 The Dionysian rebellion is
directed not against a power system as a whole or its
specific c o m m a n d m e n t s , but against the ordered
routine of everyday life, against "quotidianity" or "rationalization." His rebellion—and the kind of "significant disordering of the senses" it represents—can be
used by an established power system for strengthening
its own position, if it knows how to associate itself with,
or even arrange, protests against ordered routines 49
(Even Mao has, in the "cultural revolution," sought to
employ Dionysus.)
In the emotional character of the rebellions he provokes (and in the importance of the performing arts in
these rebellions), the collectivist Dionysus is comparable to the medieval European individualist, Tristan. 1
But there are two differences between the cult of the
Greek god and the medieval European tale: (1) In the
environment of Dionysus, normally suppressed, powerless collectivities—women and the lower classes—
intentionally seek the intoxication of rebellion against
the routine order. Aristocratic Tristan has to be infused
with an external agent to become a rebel against the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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customary roles and his own contractual obligation of
fidelity to the King. He accidentally swallows the love
potion intended for the King and is overcome by a
madness he does not understand. No longer, as in
Prometheus, is rebellion the expression of unsurpassed
intelligence. The primordial romantic hero is not the
responsible agent of his own rebellion, but an "accidental rebel"—with a cause but without his own purpose—the mechanical receptacle of an externally generated passion. j In contrast to his more interesting (as
well as more real) near-contemporary, Abelard, the
Tristan of the twelfth-century "canonical" version
does not have mind enough to have a will of his own in
his body. (2) The cult of Dionysus establishes opportunities for shared—though savage—emotional experiences in a temporary community of the intoxicated
from which, in principle, no one who appears as a
mindless adherent is excluded. The emotional potencies of Tristan and Iseult are withdrawn from everything else and totally concentrated in an exclusive pair
relationship (as a Western ascetic might withdraw from
the " w o r l d " for the sake of his " s o u l " alone).
The love potion was apparently lacking in the Celtic
sources of the myth, in which love was initiated by a
conscious agent, the king's wife. What had started as a
woman's spontaneous passion in Celtic mythology became, in the hands of the courtly poets of twelfthcentury France, an impersonal power overwhelming
both man and woman and transforming them into sadly
exalted "mechanical t o y s , " an early version of "escape
from f r e e d o m . " At the roots of the " a l c h e m y " of
romantic love is the transformation into a power-driven
machinery, separated from consciousness, of that activated receptivity called emotion.
Perhaps to make a historical advance in the understanding of an emotional (or intellectual or moral)
quality, it needs first to be "alienated" from the organic
flow of everyday existence of human beings, "conhttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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structed" as a mechanism so that it could be seen more
clearly (at the risk that what is helpful as a visual aid
becomes a source of corruption when literally imitated
in social action). Whether this interpretation clarifies
the historical function of the "objectifi cation of love" in
the Tristanic legend or not, the contents of the myth
document a ritualism of mutuality without spontaneity
(and hence without change) and of individualism without self-determination (and hence without responsibility). It is as if a courtly Confucian had to make sense
out of the emerging emotional dynamics of modern
Western civilization.14
The contraction of an individual's emotional life to
the totalization of a passion alienates the individual not
only from everyone not included in such a relationship,
but also from aspects of his own self that cannot be
encompassed within it and must therefore be suppressed. The Tristan story suggests that such transformation of the life world into a mechanism of private
passion transforms emotion itself into a "thing," an
alien substance, for the individual in whom it materializes (=the love potion, an intrusion detached from,
but compelling, one's personality); and it ends up
transforming the person on whom it is totally focused
also into a " t h i n g " that is programmed to perform a
highly stylized ritual. In a collectivized form, this also
happens in Dionysian rites.
But it has not happened to Abelard, whose intellectual rebellion preceded, and then overlapped, the unorthodoxy of his secular love for Heloise; he had purposes of his own in both, and continued to analyse and
to do his work—though, as he thought, less creatively—even while he loved. 14 ' 31> 32 Hence the hypothesis
on Tristanic-Dionysian (as contrasted to Promethean or
Abelardian) behavior: Emotionality
detached
from
normal everyday concerns, from ethics, and from the
habit of analysis—and also from the people who do not
immediately participate in its making—"freezes''
both
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its sender and its recipient into a death-like state of
compulsion, whatever their self-perceptions of "emotional v i t a l i t y . " The search for intensity in selfsufficient emotion transforms emotion itself into a
mechanism. "Miraculous intrusion" at its purest processes its recipient to the most exact specifications. In
dreams begin factories.
Yet in the Tristan legend, for the first time, mythology provides a model for man and woman to be equal
fellow-rebels. 1 For Satan—as currently for the mass
advertiser—woman was a promiscuously used instrument to attract other men into his field of domination.
For Prometheus, she—his apparently wholly domestic
wife—was an attached non-participant in his rebellion.
For Dionysus, she was a temporarily self-involving
mass of faceless followers.
The Tristanic model of a joint rebellion by equal
individuals for the sake of an interest that they do not
share with anyone else has, however, simultaneously
established the Western paradigm of private suffering:
the impossibility of intimacy when individuals relate to
each other by that which alienates them from their own
identities.
IV
The Satanic theory of rebellious behavior appears to
require both a social structure built for the maximization of obedience and elimination of independence, and
an intellectual tradition of rigorous (non-cooperative)
dualism. A civilization like the traditional Chinese,
which comes close to eliminating individual independence in politically relevant action, but does not favor
rigorous dualism in thought, does not generate Satanic
interpretations of rebellious behavior. And in the
post-medieval bourgeois societies of Western Europe,
including those of the most rigorous Calvinistic shaping—which tended, however, to legitimate individual
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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independence (through "voluntary consent") 2 8 - 4 8 —the
hold of Satan declined with the stabilization of the new
order. Given an obedience-maximizing structure and a
dualistic tradition, social strains and particularly
threats to this structure and tradition increase the
likelihood, and the virulence, of Satanic theories. 5 ' 4 6
Thus it is when an obedience-maximizing social structure is beginning to break down—or to appear "untidy"—that Satanic theories—and revolutionary (or
counter-revolutionary) movements which frequently
become their carriers—emerge into prominence." 1
If there is little culturally visible untidiness, or if one
takes it for granted that there will always be untidy
areas in human experience and gets used to them,
Satanic theories of rebellious behavior should have a
limited appeal—or Satanic rebels might be perceived in
the relatively innocuous guise of merely "romantic" or
" d e c a d e n t " e c c e n t r i c s , as they tended to be in
nineteenth-century England. But with Byron we leave
the realm of mythology for that of aesthetics, and with
Swinburne we witness the transformation of the Satanic
into the Dionysian mode of the avant-garde culture.
It is conceivable that conditions under which Satanic
theories arise also favor Satanic behavior, as the
twentieth-century totalitarianisms (promoted and legitimated by the rigorous dualism of racist and class
ideologies) suggest. However, a mythological construct
should not be seen as a reflection of observed, that is
already existing behavior, but rather as a selective
editing and creative elaboration of fantasy dispositions
that arise in response to the conjunction of a particular
organization of social relations and a particular set of
basic forms for the intuitive perception of order and
disorder. In imagination, alternative possibilities of behavior are actively tried out (and sometimes judged to
be wanting). But the trials of what is currently experienced are conducted in the courthouse of the basic
categories and formalizations explicitly provided by
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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one's intellectual tradition or implicit in it.
Thus the analysis of the interpretations of rebellious
behavior underlines the impossibility of understanding
the distinctive symbolic designs of particular civilizations either without reference to their social structures or as direct reflections of their social structures.
Nor, in all likelihood, should differences in symbolic
designs be read as registering corresponding differences in visible behavior, or the absence of a particular
symbolic design be interpreted as indicating the absence of the behavior which other peoples objectify in
such designs. What symbolic designs in their totality
express exists, outside of them, only in the imagination;
and not all the " r a w materials" of experience that exist
outside of the active imagination are transmuted into its
splendid and horrifying craftsmanship. 2 0
V
The Greeks have provided two mythological models
for rebellion: a "rational" rebellion for the privileged
individual (Prometheus) and an "emotional" rebellion
for the underprivileged collectivity (Dionysus). The
modern European civilization inverts the equation: an
" e m o t i o n a l " rebellion for the privileged individual
(Tristan), a "rational" rebellion, later on, for the oppressed collectivity (Marx). Dionysus has been individualized, Prometheus collectivized.
Both Greece and the modern West knew morally
justifiable, rational rebellions, but located them differently; and psychologically understandable, emotional
rebellions, but conceived the emotions underlying such
rebellions as divinely inspired in one case (Greece,
where it was the emotion of the downtrodden), as artificially induced in the other (the West, where it became
the emotion of the cultivated). Only the downtrodden
need divine inspiration for their rebellions; the cultivated hold the means to inspire themselves in their own
hands (even when they do not know what they hold).
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol3/iss3/3
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But the medieval paradigm of the Satanic rebellion
continues to insinuate itself into the modern shapes of
both Prometheus and Dionysus. Greek mythological
rebels could be exactly what they were: gods, titans.
Satan (and, with him, a multitude of nineteenth- and
twentieth-century rebels) are functionaries who seek to
be gods capable of creating themselves. In our times, it
has become a legitimate aspiration to make of oneself,
individually or collectively, an artificial god. We are
condemned to discover whether the Satanic rebellion is
destructive only when it is "defined as deviant" by the
surrounding society, or whether it too constitutes a
sociopsychological model universally valid for that
which it comprehends.
VI
I conclude by re-emphasizing two methodological
points. (I) An effective starting point in the comparative
study of the symbolic designs of civilizations is to focus
on a particular theme, found in several civilizations,
and embodied in a cultural product that lends itself to
both psychological and sociological analysis. Such a
comparison, carried far enough, reveals differences in
the symbolic interpretations and elaborations of the
shared theme as well as the interconnections of this
theme with other major components of each civilization
(if the probable presence of such interconnections can
be persuasively demonstrated).
(2) A productive method in civilization analysis is the
tracing of the linkages between the key notions—culturally strategic general concepts the historically specific embodiments of which are treated, in particular
civilizations, as necessarily associated with each other,
or as mutually exclusive or as having an indeterminate
and variable relationship between themselves. Linkages between an ideological notion, such as rebellion,
and a psychological mechanism presumed to underly
the behavior oriented to this notion are also worth notPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1979
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ing. Presumed interdependencies between the notions
oipower, knowledge, virtue, and law in the Greek and
the Judeo-Christian traditions have been brought out as
particularly important in the present case. But, for an
adequate analysis of the symbolic designs of civilizations (and their changes over time) through linkages
among key notions, an inventory of perhaps twenty to
fifty such notions, for each civilization at distinguishable stages of its development, might be needed. 3
Dickinson

College

Notes
* Expanded version of a paper presented at the Conference on
Civilizational Patterns and Intercivilizational Encounters, held by
the International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations, August 30-31, 1973, at the University of Chicago.
a
In my usage of these terms, a "structure of consciousness"
refers to a relatively coherent set of categories of thought, a "mode
of sensibility'' to an empirically given set of perceptual orientations,
that are shared and relatively enduring in a given socio-historical
setting.
b
"Promethean" culture heroes who have stolen, "through cunning or daring,'' fire, grain, or the sheep from the gods are familiar to
a variety of preliterate societies above the level of archaic cultivators. 1 9 But the myths dealing with these heroes constitute descriptions of the origin of a cultural trait rather than explanations of
the behavior of an individual. In the mythology of the Dogon,
personal motivation for stealing fire, by the "ancestral constructor," from "the workshop of the great N u m m o , who are Heaven's
smiths," is replaced by an impersonal assignment: he steals because
"his future task was to teach men the use of iron to enable them to
cultivate the land." 1 6 In a sense, the primeval blacksmith of the
Dogon is the idea of Prometheus without his
personality.
c

Prometheus' relations with feminine figures are specifically
worth noting. By some accounts, it was Athena (whom Prometheus,
by splitting the skull of Zeus, helped to be born; thus a woman "of
the younger generation") who taught him many of the practical
skills he then transmitted to men. And it was his mother, Themis,
who provided him with his ultimate resource—knowledge of the
future. Prometheus not only does not misuse women to gratify his
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whims (as Greek gods habitually do), but he makes good use of the
creative strengths women possess and willingly share with him. He
is unafraid to be dependent on women at the same time that he helps
them. In contrast, there are no significant w o m e n in Satan's early
history, and in his later career he manipulates women to achieve his
goal of seducing men to do his bidding. In this respect, he is somewhat comparable to Zeus who sends Pandora, the first human
woman, to punish men for receiving the Promethean gift of fire. But
in the Greek scheme of metaphysical sobriety it was the highest
god—not an evil spirit—who both misused women to indulge himself and manipulated them to exercise his control over men.
d
Perceptions of the individual actor as either a blameless agent of
a greater power (who does not consider himself responsible even
when he commits evil acts) or as an entirely independent actor who
establishes his own responsibilities by his o w n moral decision are
peculiar to the Western civilization, but they (especially the latter,
"Promethean" perception) tend to be lacking in other civilizations.
Both notions are alien to Confucianism.' 0 , 1 2
e
In Christian religious thought, the evil is sometimes perceived as
"objectively necessary" to enhance man's understanding of the
nature of the good or as a stage in man's development, through guilt
and expiation, toward proper humility. But even when necessary for
the benefit of mankind, the evil itself, as a component of the underlying moral structure, remains evil, does not evolve into the good or
fuse with the good. Nor does the good, in its perfection, need evil; it
is only men, with their imperfect understanding of the moral
structure, who need evil as a "visual aid." The crucial point is that,
in the medieval Christian tradition, the objective moral structure
within which human existence is comprehended is not perceived as
evolving through confrontations of " g o o d " with " e v i l . "
' Social conditions favoring the original elaboration of a mythical
construct do not have to be exactly replicated in the historical
environments in which some versions of that construct later on
acquires more or less of a popular appeal. Thus the popularity of the
Promethean theme in the literature of Augustan Rome is to be
explained partly by the esteem it gave to Greek culture, and in part
by its need for models of secular, activistic heroism. Once the
Promethean theme is available, it lends itself to be drawn upon, in
literature, by the secular humanists and, in the visual arts, by the
cultists of passion and suffering, whether religious or secular. 4 1 The
theme had considerable prominence in Renaissance and Baroque
art.
g
And Denis Donoghue s e e s as the Promethean " f o r m " or
"genre" of feeling what is in fact a conflation of Dionysian and
Faustian themes. It is not Prometheus who has sought "intensity
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and v e h e m e n c e " above all else, and it is not his myth that can be
"interpreted as testifying to the endlessness and namelessness of
man's d e s i r e . " 7 Such conflations of distinctive mythological
paradigms, or the appearance of one in the guise of another, seem to
be characteristic of periods in which the basic symbolic structure of
a civilization is undergoing a breakdown or reorganization.
h
In China, "legitimated protest was an intellectually central and
institutionally prominent aspect of the traditional political culture." 2 9 "Byzantine Christian officials, much more than Chinese
Confucianists, were a despot's faceless men." 2 7 Karl A. Wittfogel
does not recognize the importance of the "symbolic" distinction
made here. 5 1
1
Like Prometheus, Drystan started out, in the medieval Welsh
tradition, as a trickster—an origin unimaginable for the ever-serious
Satan.
' By 1210, however, a version of the Tristanic myth appears in
which love potion is but a symbol of spontaneous mutual responsiveness. 1 8
k
In Chinese Confucian thought, strong emotion between the
sexes has tended to be perceived as not originating in the internal
dynamics of a personality, but as "the work of others," induced
from without. 4 0
1
The reality of man and woman as equal cooperators in an important creative task emerged almost at the same time in the movement of affective mysticism. 3 0
m
Mary Douglas points out that "when moral rules are obscure or
contradictory there is a tendency for pollution beliefs to simplify or
clarify the point at issue." 8
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